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As well as being an extreme measure taken by a government, internment, a process where 
persons are imprisoned on the authority of a senior politician and without due process or 
judicial trial proceedings solely on the grounds that they are perceived as a threat to the state  
is both politically and legally a sensitive subject. In recent times the UK introduced interment 
during the 1968-1997 Irish Troubles and, it could be argued following the 9/11 Al Qaeda 
attacks on the USA, in 2001 when Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 was introduced. 
Overview of the Topic 
1. Why Interment was introduced in Northern Ireland in the 1970’s – When 
the British Army were sent to Northern Ireland in 1969 it was believed that 
within a certain timescale they would defeat an Irish republican group, the 
Provisional IRA (PIRA), who wanted the end of British rule in the Province, but 
by 1971 it was recognised that this was not possible (McCleery 2012 p. 415-
416). From January to July 1971 violence in Northern Ireland intensified as 
there had been 304 bomb explosions, 13 Soldiers, 2 police officers and16 
civilians killed during that period (Ireland v UK (1978) application 5310/71, 
paragraph 32). Added to the explosions and deaths, three reasons were given by 
the British Government why internment was deemed necessary in 1971: 
(a) Normal procedures of investigation and criminal prosecution had become 
inadequate to deal with PIRA terrorists and it was considered that the 
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ordinary criminal courts could no longer be relied on as the sole process of 
law for restoring peace and order; 
(b) There was widespread intimidation of the Northern Irish population and 
such intimidation made it impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to secure 
a criminal conviction against known PIRA terrorists. Also the conduct of 
police enquiries was seriously hampered by the grip PIRA had in certain 
‘no-go’ areas that were Catholic strongholds where, unlike the police, IRA 
operatives could operate in comparative safety; 
(c) The ease of escape routes across the territorial border between Northern 
Ireland the Irish Republic presented difficulties of control for the authorities 
(Ireland v UK (1978) application 5310/71, paragraph36). 
2. The first statutory order used – the first piece of legislation used to introduce 
internment in 1971 was article 12 of The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1922.  Article 12 gave the Northern Ireland Home Affairs 
minister a power to issue an internment order against a person who is suspected 
of acting or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of 
peace and the maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and this period of 
internment was without trial. This power had been on the statutes in both 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic since the 1921 partition of the island 
and had been used on three previous occasions in Northern Ireland, the last prior 
to 1971 being from 1956-1961 were the IRA had been active, but to a lesser 
extent than PIRA were during the Irish Troubles. 
3. Operation Demetrius – at 4.30 am on the 9th August 1971, armed with a list of 
names and addresses of suspected PIRA operatives, the British Army, supported 
by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) raided a number of premises in 
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Northern Ireland. Of the 342 men arrested that day, 116 were released within 48 
hours (McEvoy 2001 p.211). One problem with the intelligence used to provide 
the Army and RUC’s list of targets to be arrested and detained was it contained 
names of retired republicans, trade unionists, middle-class civil rights 
campaigners  and in many cases men whose republican connections was no 
more than inactive sympathy for PIRA (McCleery 2012 P.418). One result of 
the introduction of internment is it united Catholics on a scale not previously 
seen in the Province (Moloney 2002 p.102) including increasing the support for 
PIRA. This support saw an upsurge in violence resulting in 610 murders in the 
first 17 months after internment compared to 66 in the first two years leading up 
to internment (Dixon and O’Kane 2011 p.30). The powers the British Army 
were using seemed to be arbitrary and were questioned in Kelly v Faulkner 
[1973] N. Ir. L. R. 31. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal refused to accept 
that British soldiers dealing with emergency powers should be exempt from the 
normal requirements for the execution of a valid arrest. This was addressed by 
the UK Parliament who on introducing section 12 of the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 gave members of Her Majesty’s armed forces 
the power to arrest persons they suspect of committing, having committed or 
being about to commit any offence (section 12(1)). These statutory provisions 
included a power of entry and search to premises the member of the armed 
forces to arrest that person or person they suspected of being a terrorist or 
having committed an offence involving the use or possession of explosives or a 
firearm (section 12(3)). 
4. Legislation Governing Internment in Northern Ireland  post 1971 – 
Following the Detention of Terrorists Order 1972 issued from Westminster, 
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from 1973 a number of Emergency Provisions Acts were introduced from 
Westminster with the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 where 
Schedule 1 of the 1973 and in the subsequent Acts of 1975 and 1978 covered 
the detention of terrorists. In the 1973 Act it was a Commissioner that 
authorised a suspected terrorist’s detention with a Commissioner being a person 
that held or had held a judicial office in the UK (Schedule 1 Part I paragraph 3 
1973 Act. The Northern Ireland (Emergency provisions) Act 1975 and the 
Emergency Provisions Acts that followed changed this to an advisor. The 
authorisation of the detention of terrorists (persons who had been concern win 
the commission or attempted commission of an act of terrorism or who had 
directed, organised or trained persons for the purpose of terrorism – Schedule 1 
Part I paragraph 8(1)(a) Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1975)) by 
the Secretary of State (Northern Ireland minister) where that detention was 
necessary for the protection of the public (Schedule 1 Part I paragraph 8(1)(b) 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1975) could only be made 
provided they had received a report from an Advisor. An Advisor was simply a 
change of term from a Commissioner in the 1973 Act, as it was still a person 
who held or who had held a judicial office in the UK (Schedule 1 Part I 
paragraph 3(1)).  
5. Ireland’s human rights challenge against the UK - When introducing the 
legislation relating to internment in Northern Ireland, the UK Government 
declared a derogation from its obligations laid down in the relevant articles 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Providing the 
measures taken are not inconsistent with obligations under international law, 
article 15 ECHR allows a state to derogate from ECHR obligations in a time of 
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war or other public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. In relation to 
the UK’s internment legislation, this was examined by the European Court for 
Human Right in Ireland v UK (1978) Application number 5319/71. The Court 
unanimously held that at that time there existed in Northern Ireland a public 
emergency that was threatening the life of the nation within the meaning of 
article 15 (II On Article 5 paragraph 11) and that by a majority vote (16-1) the 
period of internment form 1971 – 1975 did not violate article 5 (right to liberty) 
(II On Article 5 paragraph 13), although the Court did find  that there was a 
violation of article 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment) in 
the interviewing practices deployed by the RUC (I On Article 3 paragraphs 1 – 
10). The important factor in this decision was the ‘life of the nation’ was 
threatened by the continued programme of violence carried out by PIRA as well 
as by loyalist terror groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force. 
6. Criticism of internment in Northern Ireland – It has been claimed that 
internment in Northern Ireland did no more than send out a message that Irish 
Republicans were the enemy with internment demonstrating the UK 
Government’s desire not only to reduce the levels of violence but also 
incapacitate Republican suspects and use it as a broader symbolic punishment of 
those who opposed the Northern Irish state (McEvoy 2001 p.215). It was not 
just academic writers that were critical of internment during the Irish Troubles, 
there was also political criticism. Lord Gardiner, a Labour party politician and 
Lord Chancellor from 1964–1978 carried out a report in 1975 on the UK 
Parliament’s legislative provisions in Northern Ireland. His Report was critical 
of internment as he saw it as bringing the law into contempt and caused deep 
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resentment, a resentment that increased the violence in the Province (1975 pp-
38-49). He said: 
‘In the short term [internment] may be an effective means of containing violence, 
but the prolonged effects of the use of detention are ultimately inimical to 
community life, fan a widespread sense of grievance and injustice and obstruct 
those elements in Northern Ireland society which could lead to reconciliation’ 
(1975 p.43).   
    The Gardiner Report was discussed in the House of Commons in February 1975 and 
the political mood at the time can be seen in the exchanges that took place. When asked 
about the criticism in the Report that holding detainees under internment orders were 
contrary to social justice Mr Orme, the former Northern Ireland minister replied 
impassively that the Gardiner Committee also acknowledged that detention was a 
matter for political decision. This was a response he gave to other points raised in the 
Report by MP’s concerning the condition of the prisons those arrested under internment 
provisions were detained in and how there should be a separate Bill for Rights for 
Northern Ireland (Hansard 13
th
 February 1975). As well as criticism within the UK of 
internment, international condemnation of the policy peaked in 1981 when Republican 
prisoners went on hunger strike (Coogan1995 pp227-229). That protest ended with ten 
of the hunger strikers dying between May – August 1981 (Coogan 1995, p.236). One of 
the hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, although a detainee in prison, stood as an ‘H-
Block/Armagh’ candidate in the Fermanagh-South Tyrone constituency by-election and 
was elected as an MP in April 1981 (Taylor 1997 p. 240). It was events such as these 
that resonate with Lord Gardiner’s findings where internment resulted in a more deeply 
divided and entrenched community making it harder for reconciliation processes to take 
place. 
7. UK Internment of jihadist terrorists – Following the 9/11 attacks by Al 
Qaeda terrorists on the USA, the UK introduced the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
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Security Act 2001 where Part IV raised concerns in relation to articles 5 (right 
to liberty and freedom) and 6 (right to a fair trial) of the ECHR. In effect the Act 
was internment of non-UK nationals who were believed to be a terrorist threat 
to the UK. The detention orders were granted under the order of a senior 
politician without any judicial security or the opportunity to challenge the 
incarceration in a UK court of law. In part IV, section 21 of the Act gave the 
Home Secretary power to detain in prison persons they reasonably believed was 
a terrorist and their presence in the UK was a risk to national security. This 
provision applied only to non-UK citizens and the detention was deemed 
necessary where their removal from the UK was prevented by a point of law 
related to an international agreement or a practical consideration (those points of 
law included those contained in Schedule 3 of the Immigration Act 1971) . In 
enacting these provisions the UK state relied on an article 15 ECHR derogation 
issued under section 14 Human Rights Act 1998 where the UK state argued that 
this was needed as the international terrorist group, Al Qaeda’s threat was 
sufficient to be a public emergency that threatened the life of the nation (A and 
others v SSHD [2004] UKHL 56 at paragraphs 16 – 24). The grounds of the 
emergency was provided by the Attorney General who submitted the emergency 
could be regarded as imminent if: 
‘…an atrocity was credibly threatened by a body such as Al Qaeda which had 
demonstrated its capacity and will to carry out such a threat, where the atrocity 
might be committed without warning at any time. The Government, responsible 
as it was and is for the safety of the British people, need not wait for disaster to 
strike before taking necessary steps to prevent it striking (at paragraph 25)’ 
 
Lord Bingham stated these provisions were discriminatory as they applied to 
non-UK nationals only and did not include UK citizens, especially those who 
were radicalised and who were also seen as a terrorist threat. He drew 
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comparisons with Northern Ireland internment provisions that were tested in 
Ireland v UK (1978) that were not seen as discriminatory as they applied to both 
Republican and Loyalist terrorists (at paragraph 54). He highlighted how the 
claim by the UK Government that international terrorists were a threat to the 
‘life of the nation’ was undermined by the fact UK nationals who are suspected 
terrorists are just as dangerous as non-UK nationals (at paragraph 53). 
Regarding the article 15 derogation Lord Hoffman examined what was meant 
by the term ‘threatening the life of a nation’. In his judgement he gave an 
eloquent explanation of factors to consider when applying article 15 under the 
provision of ‘threatening the life of a nation’. He said: 
‘When one speaks of the “life” of the nation, the word life is being used in the 
metaphorical sense. The life of the nation is not coterminous with lives of its 
people. The nation, its institutions and values, endure through generations. 
England is the same nation as it was at the time of the first Elizabeth or the 
Glorious Revolution. The Armada threatened to destroy the life of the nation, 
not by loss of life in battle, but by subjecting English institutions to the rule of 
Spain and the Inquisition. The same was true of the threat posed to the United 
Kingdom by Nazi Germany in the Second World War. This country, more than 
any other in the world, has an unbroken history of living for centuries under 
institutions and in accordance with values which show a reasonable continuity’ 
(at paragraph 91) 
 
The threat is in regard to the way of life as how the UK is governed, its laws, its 
traditions and values. The life of a nation is not the sole preserve of the physical 
life of a person. This is an important point to consider regarding terrorist threat. 
During the Irish Troubles PIRA’s England Department ASU’s attacked the 
British Government’s Cabinet in the 1984 Brighton bomb (Taylor 1997 pp.252-
253) as well as mortar bombing the centre of the Government’s Cabinet at 10 
Downing Street in 1991 (Taylor 1997 p.321), which along with the attacks on 
the British military targets on the British mainland did not bring to its knees the 
life of the British nation. However as highlighted above, the activity of both 
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Republican and Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland was threatening the life of 
the Province. This included the UK Government in Westminster suspending the 
government rule from Stormont in Northern Ireland, and granting the British 
Army powers of arrest and search within the Province. One can see why in 
Ireland v UK (1978) the European Court of Human Rights accepted the article 
15 derogation order from the UK. Even the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks did not 
weaken the life of the USA. It disrupted it for a day, but as we have seen since 
that attack, the US nation life is stronger in regards to dealing with the terrorist 
threat it faces today. 
8. Impact of the House of Lords decision in A and others v SSHD (2004) –An 
order by a politician requiring the arrest and detention of persons suspected of 
being a terrorist or linked to acts of terrorism without any judicial scrutiny is 
one that not only challenges constitutional issues around the rule of law and 
security of the liberty of the individual, but is a divisive move as it can not only 
entrench values and opinions and be an accelerant to further violence and 
hostility. In the House of Lords finding that Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 violated article 5 (right to liberty of the person), 6 
(right fair trial) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) (A and others v SSHD 
[2004] UKHR 51, paragraphs 71-73), key to this was the derogation was not 
necessary and proportionate as required under article 15. This was confirmed by 
the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber in A v UK (2009) 
Application 3455/05 who on examining the provision of article 15 ECHR held 
that national authorities should not be criticised when in light of the evidence 
available at the time they fear an attack that can lead to an atrocity might be 
committed without warning. The Grand Chamber added that a State does not 
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have to wait for a disaster to strike before taking article 15 measures (at 
paragraph 177). The Grand Chamber did state that under article 15 when 
assessing whether the life of a nation is threatened by a public emergency 
weight must not only be given to a state’s executive and Parliament, but also 
weight must also be accorded to the views of national courts, ‘…who are better 
placed to assess the evidence relating to the existence of an emergency’ (at 
paragraph 180). The Grand Chamber agreed with the majority decision of the 
House of Lords in A and others. As a result of the decision in A and others the 
UK Government introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 that 
introduced control orders granted with judicial supervision which were later 
found to violate the ECHR and resulted in Tpims. a diluted form of a control 
order being introduced in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
Act 2011. These are quasi-criminal provisions of maintaining surveillance on 
those suspected to be terrorists but where there is insufficient evidence to bring 
criminal proceedings against individual. The lesson for states who want to act 
within the rule of law regarding internment provisions is that taking a person’s 
liberty away, especially without judicial supervision is very serious step and is 
not one to be taken lightly. Reliance on derogation under article 15 ECHR based 
on a narrow interpretation of what amounts to the threat to nation by a terrorist 
threat cannot be so easily achieved. While terrorist actions such as the 2005 
London bombing by Al Qaeda operatives (who were UK nationals) are tragic, 
such actions, as Lord Hoffman pointed out  in A and others does not threaten 
the life of a nation.  
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